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THE ENGLISH CHILDREN AND 
FAMILIES ACT 2014 
Andrew Bainham* and Stephen Gilmore** 
Parts I and II of the Children and Families Act 2014 may appear to make little change to English 
child law, largely amending existing statutes with provisions of a procedural and evidential flavour. 
Yet, as this article explains, it is deeply ideological legislation with roots in the Narey Report on 
adoption and the Family Justice Review. The article examines the background to the legislation and 
shows how, in the private law, statutory language was used to convey an "official" message 
concerning the importance of both separating parents remaining "involved" in their children’s lives. 
This resulted in enactment of a presumption of parental involvement in court decision making, and a 
more neutral "child arrangements order", replacing the supposed polarising duality of "residence" 
and "contact" orders with little more than a change of terminology and the disadvantage of greater 
complexity. The ideology underpinning the public law provisions is to encourage adoption by 
speeding up the process, getting children through care proceedings as quickly as possible and into 
adoptive families.  This thinking may appear to clash with recent jurisprudence of the higher courts 
which has emphasised that adoption is a "last resort" in child protection, and that significant human 
rights issues arise. The analysis highlights a key question, cutting across the public and private law 
provisions, namely whether the 2014 Act dilutes English law's long-standing commitment to the 
paramountcy of child welfare. 
I INTRODUCTION  
Writing in 2006,1 Bill Atkin said of the then recent Care of Children Act 2004 that its title was 
something of a misnomer. The legislation did not deal with child care issues in their entirety, and 
most notably, child protection issues in New Zealand remained governed by the earlier Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989.  
  
*  Barrister at St Philips Chambers, Emeritus Reader in Family Law and Policy, University of Cambridge. 
Andrew was editor of the International Survey of Family Law from 1994–2006 during which period he 
greatly appreciated the regular, erudite contributions of Bill Atkin on developments in New Zealand. He 
was therefore delighted when Bill assumed the editorship in 2006 which has enabled the Survey to go on 
from strength to strength.  
**  Professor of Family Law, King’s College London. 
1  Bill Atkin "New Zealand: Landmark Family Legislation" in Andrew Bainham (ed) The International Survey 
of Family Law (Jordan Publishing, Bristol, 2006) 305 at 306. 
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Much the same can be said of the deceptively entitled Children and Families Act 2014 (UK) (the 
2014 Act), which made it to the statute book in England last year. While the Act apparently ranges 
widely over the private law, the public law, adoption, special educational needs, childcare, the 
children's commissioner, parental leave, antenatal care and flexible working, it is in no sense a 
comprehensive family code.2 Indeed, so far as pts I (Adoption and Children Looked After by Local 
Authorities) and II (Family Justice) are concerned, the 2014 Act merely dips into the existing 
statutory framework under the Children Act 1989 (UK) (the 1989 Act) and the Adoption and 
Children Act 2002 (UK), largely just amending those statutes. Such changes as it does make, 
especially in the public law, have a strong procedural and evidential flavour, perhaps masking the 
ideological shifts which underpin these provisions. This is the nature of the difficulty for anyone 
seeking to understand the new English legislation. At first blush it appears to make little change to 
the substantive private and public law, or adoption. Yet, as we shall seek to show in this article, in 
truth this is a deeply ideological piece of legislation which has its roots in the Narey Report on 
adoption3 and the Family Justice Review.4  
II THE PRIVATE LAW 
A Background 
The private law provisions of pt II of the 2014 Act represent a package of reforms attempting to 
address longstanding debates concerning the courts' approach to adjudicating on post-separation 
parenting arrangements.5 Those dissatisfied with the law claimed that the commonplace practice of 
awarding the child's residence to one parent – and to the other mere contact with the child – did not 
adequately value both parents' involvement in the child's life. Hence, it was argued that the law 
should adopt a norm of shared parenting (put most strongly, a presumption of equal division of the 
child's time), or at least a presumption of a meaningful ongoing relationship between the child and 
  
2  In this article we are concerned only with pts I and II of the Act which might be seen as its mainstream 
family law provisions.  
3  Martin Narey "The Narey Report on Adoption: Our Blueprint for Britain's Lost Children" The Times 
(United Kingdom, 5 July 2011).  
4  Family Justice Review Panel Family Justice Review: Final Report (Ministry of Justice, November 2011) 
[Family Justice Review: Final Report]. The recommendations were substantially, though not entirely, 
accepted by the Government in Ministry of Justice and Department for Education The Government 
Response to the Family Justice Review: A system with children and families at its heart (February 2012).  
5  For an excellent discussion of law and policy development in England and Wales over the last three 
decades, see Liz Trinder "Climate change? The multiple trajectories of shared care law, policy and social 
practices" (2014) 26 CFLQ 30 (identifying five phases of evolution, played out via competing policy frames 
of child welfare and parental rights, and to a lesser extent through the "frames" of "risk" and "resources" (or 
diversion from courts)). 
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the non-resident parent. In the 2000s the issue became highly politicised6 and the end of that decade 
saw the issue in England and Wales examined by the Family Justice Review.  
The Government accepted the Family Justice Review's recommendation that "residence orders" 
and "contact orders" be replaced by a new "child arrangements order", agreeing that "contact" and 
"residence" had become unhelpfully associated with the idea of losing and winning.7  
The Family Justice Review (and subsequently the House of Commons Justice Committee)8 
concluded, however, that there should be no change to the legislative framework by which the 
courts make decisions concerning post-separation parenting arrangements. 9  The Family Justice 
Review was influenced by evaluations of the impact of legislation in Australia.10 It was said that the 
courts' required focus on the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with each 
parent had been privileged over child safety in some cases, leading to shared-care time arrangements 
being made even where there were ongoing concerns about family violence or child abuse.11 This 
led the Family Justice Review to conclude that "no legislation should be introduced that creates or 
risks creating the perception that there is a parental right to substantially shared or equal time for 
both parents",12 which might compromise the guiding principle of the paramountcy of the child's 
welfare. However, contrary to the informed opinions of the Family Justice Review and the House of 
Commons Justice Committee (the Justice Committee), the Government wanted an explicit 
"legislative statement of the importance of children having an ongoing relationship with both their 
parents after family separation, where that is safe, and in the child's best interests". The statement, 
  
6  Trinder, above n 5; and Helen Rhoades "The Rise and Rise of Shared Parenting Laws: A Critical 
Reflection" (2002) 19 Can J Fam L 75; Helen Rhoades and Susan B Boyd "Reforming Custody Laws: A 
Comparative Study" (2004) 18 IJLPF 119; and Richard Collier and Sally Sheldon (eds) Fathers' Rights 
Activism and Law Reform in Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006). 
7  Ministry of Justice and Department for Education, above n 4. Putting the point more positively, the Law 
Society of England and Wales suggested that the neutral language was "more likely to focus the court and 
the parents on the practical arrangements for caring for the child and for the co-operative parenting of that 
child": see Justice Committee Pre-legislative scrutiny of the Children and Families Bill (4th Report of 
Session 2012–2013, HC739, December 2012) at [127]. 
8  Justice Committee Operation of the Family Courts (6th Report of Session 2010–2012, HC518–I, 2011). 
9  Children Act 1989 (UK), s 1 (the paramountcy of the child's welfare, guided by a checklist).  
10  Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth). 
11  See "Annex G–Helen Rhoades' evidence in relation to shared parenting" in Family Justice Review: Final 
Report, above n 4, at 315. For discussion of the Australian experience, see Belinda Fehlberg and others 
"Legislating for Shared Time Parenting After Separation: A Research Review" (2011) 25 IJLPF 318. The 
Australian Legislature subsequently enacted the Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence & 
Other Measures) Act 2011 (Cth) to remedy this concern and to ensure that, in any balancing of factors, 
safety is given greater weight. 
12  "Executive Summary" in Family Justice Review: Final Report, above n 4, at [109]. 
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though, was to be "framed to avoid the pitfalls of the Australian experience, in particular that a 
meaningful relationship is not about equal division of time".13 
A consultation on proposed legislation swiftly followed,14 canvassing four possible models, 
including the Government's preferred option of a presumption that the welfare of the child will be 
furthered by the involvement of each parent who can be involved in a way not adverse to the child's 
safety.15 The Government reported that consultation responses showed "a clear preference among 
those who responded for legislative change", with 52 per cent of respondents who chose an option 
selecting the Government's preferred option.16 
B The New Provisions: the Child Arrangements Order and the 
Presumption of Parental Involvement 
The Government took forward its desired changes to private children law in pt II of the 2014 
Act.17 Section 12 introduced the new "child arrangements order", defined as an order regulating 
arrangements relating to any of the following: (a) with whom a child is to live, spend time or 
otherwise have contact; and (b) when a child is to live, spend time or otherwise have contact with 
any person.18 
Section 11 of the 2014 Act19 amended s 1 of the 1989 Act to introduce a presumption of 
parental involvement whenever the court is considering whether to make20 a child arrangements 
  
13  Ministry of Justice and Department for Education, above n 4, at [61] and [62]. 
14  Department for Education Co-operative Parenting Following Family Separation: Proposed Legislation on 
the Involvement of Both Parents in a Child's Life (13 June 2012). 
15  The other options were: a general principle that the child's welfare is likely to be furthered by the fullest 
possible involvement of each parent; a starting point that the child's welfare is likely to be furthered if each 
parent is involved; or the court simply having regard to enabling the child concerned to have the best 
relationship possible with each parent of the child. The consultation made clear that the proposed change 
was: "categorically not about equality in the time that a child spends with each parent after separation … 
Every family and every child's circumstances are different, and the courts will continue to make decisions 
on that basis." Department for Education, above n 14, at [4.4]. 
16  Department for Education Cooperative parenting following family separation: proposed legislation on the 
involvement of parents in a child's life: summary of consultation responses and the Government's response 
(November 2012). 
17  Following pre-legislative scrutiny of, and a Government response to, draft legislation: see Justice 
Committee, above n 7; and Secretary of State for Education Children and Families Bill 2013: Contextual 
Information and Responses to Pre-Legislative Scrutiny (Cm 8540, February 2013). 
18  Implemented on 22 April 2014. 
19  Implemented on 22 October 2014. 
20  Or vary or discharge. 
 THE ENGLISH CHILDREN AND FAMILIES ACT 2014 631 
 
order21 which is opposed by any party to the proceedings, or considering whether to make or 
discharge a parental responsibility order.22 Section 1(2A) provides that in those circumstances a 
court "is as respects each parent within subsection (6)(a) to presume, unless the contrary is shown, 
that involvement of that parent in the life of the child concerned will further the child's welfare". 
Involvement is defined in s 1(2B) to mean "involvement of some kind, either direct or indirect, but 
not any particular division of a child's time". For the purpose of s 1(2A), a "parent of the child 
concerned" is within (6)(a) "if that parent can be involved in the child's life in a way that does not 
put the child at risk of suffering harm" and is to be so treated:23  
… unless there is some evidence before the court in the particular proceedings to suggest that 
involvement of that parent in the child's life would put the child at risk of suffering harm whatever the 
form of the involvement. 
C Criticism 
1 Complex drafting and difficulties of interpretation 
The new child arrangements order can be criticised as being little more than a change of 
terminology, whilst making the existing statute unnecessarily complex, although somewhat 
paradoxically, contrary to the Government's stated aim, it may also increase the number of shared 
time arrangements. As Liz Trinder has observed:24  
Previously, parents seeking to establish their equal status had the prospect of a symbolic shared 
residence order to fight for. Under the new regime the only outlet for that desire will be in terms of an 
equal time split rather than a label. 
The new terminology has necessitated numerous consequential amendments to the 1989 Act, for 
example replacing references to a "residence order" with more complex constructions such as "a 
child arrangements order in which a person is named as the person with whom a child is to live".25 
However, in order to retain the different legal incidents that attached to residence and contact orders 
respectively, it has been necessary in amending the statute to make clear at various points which 
type of child arrangements order is being referred to, thus in substance retaining the distinction 
  
21  The presumption applies to the making of any order under s 8 of the Children Act 1989 (UK); that is, also to 
a specific issue order or a prohibited steps order. 
22  An order under s 4(1)(c) or (2A), or s 4ZA(1)(c) or (5) of the Children Act 1989 (UK) (parental 
responsibility of parent other than mother). 
23  Children Act 1989 (UK), s 6(1)(a) and (b). 
24  Trinder, above n 5, at 49. 
25  See Children and Families Act 2014 (UK), sch 2. 
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between contact and residence.26 The child arrangements order has complicated matters because the 
nature of the order is no longer immediately apparent from the title of the order: one now needs to 
interrogate the content of the order to know its general legal consequences. 
The new presumption of parental involvement is also an extremely complex construction, which 
no doubt is likely to require judicial clarification. Commentators have already highlighted potential 
problems of interpretation. 
As the authors have observed elsewhere, the complex drafting appears to admit of the fact that 
the circumstances in which a parent is defined as being "worthy" of the presumption applying need 
not necessarily be the circumstances in which the presumption will be applied.27 For example, 
where a court concludes that involvement by indirect contact would not put the child at risk, it 
seems that the presumption would apply even on an application for direct contact, even though there 
may be evidence that direct contact would place the child at risk of harm. Of course, the 
presumption might in such a case be readily rebutted, but the fact remains that the onus would then 
be on the respondent to provide evidence to rebut it, which might prove problematic, particularly in 
cases involving litigants in person.  
The fact that s 1(2A) applies to applications for parental responsibility, as well as those under s 
8 of the 1989 Act, may also prove problematic, since it must follow that "involvement" can mean 
mere possession of parental responsibility (that is, the involvement which applicants for parental 
responsibility will be seeking).28 It is difficult to see, therefore, how any applicant for a child 
arrangements order who already has parental responsibility for a child could fail to be deemed to be 
worthy of "involvement" with the child. 
One particularly thorny issue of interpretation is likely to be how the presumption can be 
reconciled with the paramountcy of the child's welfare as set out in s 1(1) of the 1989 Act. Ryder J 
(now Ryder LJ), giving evidence to the Justice Committee, commented that the new provision could 
be interpreted as a general imperative rather than a presumption, highlighting what judges already 
believe is good practice, subject to the overarching principle of the welfare of the child.29 It is 
submitted that this view is not easy to sustain given the express wording that the court is "to 
presume, unless the contrary is shown, that involvement of that parent in the life of the child 
  
26  For example, in s 13 of the Children Act 1989 (UK) where it is all important to know whether a primary 
carer of a child does, or does not, require the permission of the other parent or the court in order to take the 
child on a short holiday abroad for up to one month.  
27  Andrew Bainham and Stephen Gilmore Children: The Modern Law (4th ed, Jordan Publishing, Bristol, 
2013) at 243; and Stephen Gilmore and Lisa Glennon Hayes and Williams' Family Law (4th ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2014) at 482. 
28  The only definition of "involvement" is in s 1(2B) which provides that "'involvement' means involvement of 
some kind, either direct or indirect, but not any particular division of a child's time".  
29  Justice Committee, above n 7, at [159]. 
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concerned will further the child's welfare".30 Thus what s 11 of the 2014 Act enacts is truly a 
presumption, introducing an onus of contrary proof. The provision is impossible to reconcile with 
the view of Munby LJ (now the President of the Family Division) in Re F (Relocation) that there 
"can be no presumptions in a case governed by s 1 of the Children Act 1989".31 This is of course 
because the welfare principle requires a court to consider all the circumstances bearing on welfare, 
rather than the basic facts of a presumption simply prevailing in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary. A concern, given the focus on parental involvement, is that the presumption may run the 
risk in some cases that the welfare of the child will be subordinate to parents' interests.  
As Thorpe LJ cautioned in Re L (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence), there:32 
 … is a danger that the identification of a presumption will inhibit or distort the rigorous search for the 
welfare solution. There is also the danger that a presumption may be used as an aid to determination 
when the individual advocate or judge feels either undecided or overwhelmed. 
2 Ideologically driven not evidence-based 
The introduction of a presumption of parental involvement is also questionable given the social 
science research evidence concerning the connection between child well-being and post-separation 
parenting arrangements, and the existing case law. 
Reviews of the research evidence on the connection between contact arrangements and child 
well-being show that "it is not contact per se but the nature and quality of contact that are important 
to children's adjustment".33 Quality may depend on a range of factors, such as parents' relationships 
and the personalities of those involved, and there is a robust body of research connecting high inter-
parental conflict with deleterious effects on child well-being.34 This complexity and the dangers of 
conflict do not advocate reliance in legal decision making on generalisations, but rather a careful 
consideration of the circumstances of each disputed contact case.  
  
30  Children Act 1989 (UK), s 1(2A) (emphasis added). 
31  Re F (Relocation) [2012] EWCA Civ 1364, [2013] 1 FLR 645 at [37]. 
32  Re L (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2001] Fam 260 (CA) at 295. 
33 Stephen Gilmore "Contact/Shared Residence and Child Well-being: Research Evidence and its Implications 
for Legal Decision-Making" (2006) 20 IJLPF 344 at 358. See also Judy Dunn "Annotation: Children's 
relationships with their non-resident fathers" (2004) 45 Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 659; 
and Joan Hunt with Ceridwen Roberts Child Contact with Non-resident Parents (University of Oxford, 
Family Policy Briefing 3, 2004). For the perspectives of children recounted in later life as adults, see Jane 
Fortin, Joan Hunt and Lesley Scanlan Taking a longer view of contact: The perspectives of young adults 
who experienced parental separation in their youth (Sussex Law School, November 2012). 
34 See for example Gordon T Harold and Mervyn Murch "Inter-parental conflict and children's adaptation to 
separation and divorce: theory, research and implications for family law, practice and policy" (2005) 17 
CFLQ 185. 
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Research on shared residence arrangements35 similarly shows that child well-being is most 
strongly connected to the quality of parenting rather than the particular form of post-separation 
parenting arrangement.36 Where shared residence is practicable, success tends to reflect parenting 
styles that are "child-focused, flexible, and cooperative",37 features not typically exemplified by 
parents who are fighting over shared residence in the courts. Sometimes shared residence 
arrangements can be experienced by children as burdensome,38 particularly when they are rigid.39 
High levels of parental conflict are a particular risk factor for children in shared care arrangements, 
who can feel particularly exposed to, and caught between, their parents' conflict.40 There is also 
some evidence that overnight shared care of children under four years of age may be a risk factor for 
children's disrupted attachments and consequent behavioural problems. 41  Thus the research on 
shared residence similarly advocates a careful focus on the individual case. 
Case law already recognises that contact between parent and child is a fundamental element of 
the right to respect for family life within art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR),42 placing a positive obligation on the state to maintain or restore contact.43 Contact is seen 
  
35 For reviews and discussion of the research, see Fehlberg and others, above n 11; and Liz Trinder" Shared 
residence: a review of recent research evidence" (2010) 22 CFLQ 475. 
36  Trinder, above n 35, at 488. 
37  Fehlberg and others, above n 11, at 321–322. 
38 See for example Carol Smart "From Children's Shoes to Children's Voices" (2002) 40 Family Court Review 
307; Gry Mette D Haugen "Children's Perspectives on Everyday Experiences of Shared Residence" (2010) 
24 Children and Society 112; and J Cashmore and others Shared Care Parenting Arrangements since the 
2006 Family Law Reforms: Report for Australian Government Attorney-General's Department (Social 
Policy Research Centre, University of New South Wales, May 2010). 
39 Jennifer McIntosh and others Post-separation parenting arrangements and developmental outcomes for 
infants and children: Collected reports (Attorney-General's Department, May 2010) at 47–49. 
40 McIntosh and others, above n 39; and for discussion, see Jennifer McIntosh and Richard Chisholm 
"Cautionary notes on the shared care of children in conflicted parental separation" (2008) 14 Journal of 
Family Studies 37; Christy M Buchanan, Eleanor E Maccoby and Sanford M Dornbusch "Caught between 
Parents: Adolescents' Experience in Divorced Homes" (1991) 62 Child Development 1008; and Christy M 
Buchanan, Eleanor E Maccoby and Sanford M Dornbusch Adolescents After Divorce (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1996). 
41 McIntosh and others, above n 39, at 9. 
42  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 213 UNTS 221 (opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953), art 8. See also art 9(3) of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 
September 1990) [UNCRC], which enjoins States Parties to "respect the right of the child who is separated 
from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular 
basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests"; and arts 7, 8, 9 and 18(1) of the UNCRC, which 
are usefully identified and discussed in Andrew Bainham "Contact as a Right and Obligation" in Andrew 
Bainham and others (eds) Children and Their Families: Contact, Rights and Welfare (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2003) 62. 
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as almost always in the interests of the child,44 or put another way, the court applies the welfare 
principle to the facts of a case from the general assumption that contact is beneficial,45 and contact 
will only be denied if detrimental to the child's welfare. Thus the new presumption does not in 
substance remedy any existing mischief in the law. 46  The point should also be made that 
"involvement" of both parents, in terms of having a say in the child's life, has always continued 
despite parental separation, at least in law, because this is a matter of parental responsibility which 
both retain. This has been so ever since the enactment of the 1989 Act but has very arguably not 
been well enough appreciated by the public at large. The assumption often made that some court 
order, especially for shared residence, has been required to ensure participation in issues affecting 
the child has always been erroneous. It may be that this problem could have been ameliorated if 
Parliament had expressly stated this in the legislation rather than leaving it to implication from the 
rather obscure cluster of subsections in s 2 of the 1989 Act.47 Had this been done, the current 
perceived need for a presumption of parental involvement might have been lessened or even 
removed altogether.  
Indeed, the Government acknowledged in its consultation document that the benefit of ongoing 
involvement with both parents is already factored into court decisions. The Government's concern 
was that it was "not explicitly stated in the legislation that guides this process" and that this had 
"contributed to a perception that the law does not fully recognise the important role that both parents 
can play in a child's life".48 The aim of the provision was said to be "to reinforce the expectation at 
societal level that both parents are jointly responsible for their children's upbringing"49 and to "send 
a clear signal to separated parents".50 As Trinder observes, the period of policy debate since 2012 
can be characterised as one in which symbolism has come to the fore.51  
In the authors' opinion, there is no doubt that enactment of the new provisions was ideologically 
driven rather than representing a genuine evidence-based desire to change the substantive nature of 
court orders and court decision making.  
  
43 The principles are neatly summarised in Re C (Direct Contact: Suspension) [2011] EWCA Civ 521, [2011] 
2 FLR 912 at [37]–[47]. 
44 See for example Re O (Contact: Imposition of Conditions) [1995] 2 FLR 124 (CA) at 128. 
45 Re L (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence), above n 32. 
46  A point made by Matthew O'Grady "Shared parenting: keeping welfare paramount by learning from 
mistakes" [2013] Fam Law (April) 448. 
47  Section 2(5), (6) and (7).  
48  Department for Education, above n 14, at [3.1].  
49  At [3.2]. 
50  At [4.3]. 
51  Trinder, above n 5. 
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The political resolve to achieve desired reform can arguably be seen in the manner in which the 
consultation process with regard to the presumption of parental involvement was framed and 
reported, which seemed determined to elicit a positive response to the Government's preferred 
option. First, the analysis did not distinguish in the weight given between individual responses, and 
responses by charities, practitioner, policy or other groups, which of course were representing 
particular knowledge/expertise, and in many cases more than an individual viewpoint.52 Secondly, 
the consultation was on proposed legislative options, so there was no option of "no change". 
Thirdly, percentages cited were percentages of respondents to individual questions rather than of 
respondents to the consultation as a whole; an approach which was favourable to the Government's 
case. The views of those who refused or failed to answer a question, perhaps because they did not 
favour any option, were thus not (fully) factored in.  
As the following brief analysis will show, it is possible that if all responses were factored in, the 
Government's option would not have elicited a majority percentage in favour. There were 214 
responses to the consultation overall, of which, we are told, 53 (25 per cent) stated that they did not 
agree with any form of legislation. Of the 181 responses to the question which legislative approach 
would be most effective in meeting the Government's stated objectives, 93 (52 per cent) favoured 
the Government's option, 66 (36 per cent) selected another option and 22 (12 per cent) made no 
selection. It seems unlikely, however, that the 53 who opposed legislation would select an option. If, 
for example, only the 22 who made no selection were members of the 53 who stated they did not 
agree with any form of legislation, there would still remain 31 non-responses to the question (53 
minus 22) who are known to oppose any legislation, and who arguably could also be counted as 
making no selection. On that basis there would be 212 answers to the question and only 44 per cent 
in favour of the Government's option.53  
In addition, Felicity Kaganas' detailed analysis of the messages emanating from the debates 
leading up to enactment identifies the presumption's largely symbolic function, of restoring the 
status of fathers and confidence in a much-criticised family justice system.54 Indeed, the Justice 
  
52  A point made in Justice Committee, above n 7, at [143]. The breakdown of respondents was as follows: 
father (67); voluntary and community sector (35); academic/researcher (22); mother (18); grandparent/other 
family member (17); judge/magistrate (11); mediator (11); barrister (5); solicitor (8); and other (20). 
53  The Government's portrayal of the strength of support for its option sits rather uneasily with the fact that 56 
per cent of respondents (94 out of 167 responses) were "concerned that legislative change could lead to an 
expectation of 50/50 share of the child's time between parents – which could potentially put a child at risk of 
emotional or physical abuse where there was ongoing conflict". Furthermore, opinion was divided on 
whether legislation would encourage parents to resolve disputes out of court (of 169 responses, 43 per cent 
yes, 65 per cent no, 19 per cent not sure). Of 175 respondents, more felt that legislation would increase 
litigation (40 per cent) than decrease it (29 per cent). (Others were either not sure (17 per cent) or thought 
there would be "no change" (14 per cent).) 
54  Felicity Kaganas "A presumption that 'involvement' of both parents is best: deciphering law's messages" 
(2013) 25 CFLQ 270. 
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Committee's analysis of the relevant Minister's responses at the stage of pre-legislative scrutiny of 
the presumption55 concluded56 that its aim was "not to effect any change in Court orders but to 
tackle a perception of bias within the Courts", which moreover the Committee had "previously 
concluded has no basis in fact".57 As the Law Society of England and Wales commented, the 
provision was driven by the political reality of Ministers' "wish to be seen to be responding to the 
concerns expressed by fathers' and other groups."58 
III THE PUBLIC LAW  
The public law provisions in pt II cannot be properly understood in isolation from the ragbag of 
apparently disconnected adoption provisions in pt I. Perhaps one of the reasons why, in England and 
elsewhere, the place of adoption as a child protection mechanism is often misunderstood and 
misjudged, is because of the tendency to enact separate adoption statutes on the back of separate 
considerations by government and law reform agencies.59 This creates the impression that adoption 
is somehow detached, or even irrelevant, to the main body of children legislation as opposed to an 
integral part of it. We see this phenomenon once again in the 2014 Act.  
Having said that the adoption provisions in pt I should not be divorced from the public law 
provisions of pt II, we have to start somewhere. The logical place to start is with the latter because, 
as everyone knows, care precedes adoption in the child protection process.  
The relevant provisions are ss 13, 14 and 15 relating respectively to the control of expert 
evidence and assessments, time limits and the role of the court in relation to care plans. Of these, it 
is the issue of time limits which has perhaps evoked the greatest debate in the family law 
community.  
A Delay and the Time Factor in Family Proceedings 
The key problem in the public law, identified by the Family Justice Review and accepted by the 
Government, was delay. Figures cited by the Family Justice Review showed that cases in the county 
  
55  Including the following statements: "The intention … is to deal with the sense that there is an in-built bias 
towards one parent or another within the current system, to get more confidence into that system with those 
who come into contact with it … The most important element of this is to ensure that there is real 
confidence in those who come into contact with it … The most important element of this is to ensure that 
there is real confidence in the family justice system."  
56  Justice Committee, above n 7, at [153]. 
57  See Justice Committee, above n 8, at [65]. 
58  Law Society of England and Wales Co-operative parenting consultation response (September 2012). 
59  Thus adoption fell outside the root and branch reforms of children law by the Children Act 1989 (UK), 
continuing to be governed by its own legislation, the Adoption Act 1976 (UK). In 2002 it was again thought 
appropriate to reform adoption law as a self-contained area of law in the Adoption and Children Act 2002 
(UK).  
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court were taking on average 61 weeks, while those in the magistrates' family proceedings courts 
were taking 48 weeks, despite a target of 40 weeks having been set.60  
The problem of delay in children cases in not a new one. The "no delay" principle was an 
innovation of the 1989 Act 61 which followed separate reviews of the private and public law. The 
perception at that time was that delay was a more pressing problem in the private law,62 rather 
contrary to the current emphasis on – some would say obsession with – the issue in the public law. 
In so far as the Review of Child Care Law considered delay at all, it was largely in the context of the 
length of interim orders.63 That Review did conclude that "further consideration should be given to 
prescribing maximum time limits in care proceedings … and whether delay continues to be a 
problem in care proceedings."64 But that was as far as it went.  
The 2014 Act amends the 1989 Act and puts on a statutory footing a very much more restrictive 
time limit of 26 weeks, from the issue of proceedings to their conclusion.65 This is a mandatory time 
limit which can be extended only with the permission of the court. Permission can be given only if 
the court considers it necessary to enable it to resolve the proceedings justly.66 It is expressly 
provided that such extensions will not be granted routinely and will require "special justification".67 
Where given, an extension must not exceed eight weeks.68  
These stringent statutory limits are backed up by the Family Procedure Rules and the Revised 
Public Law Outline.69 They have provoked serious concerns about whether the best interests of the 
child can be confidently established within so short a period of time, where what is at issue is 
usually parental capacity to provide adequate care and to change for the better. This is a feature of 
the many cases in which substance abuse is a major factor, and in which the parents' willingness and 
  
60  Family Justice Review: Final Report, above n 4, at [3.2]. 
61  Children Act 1989 (UK), s 1(2) provides: "In any proceedings in which any question with respect to the 
upbringing of a child arises, the court shall have regard to the general principle that any delay in 
determining the question is likely to prejudice the welfare of the child." 
62  See Law Commission of England and Wales Review of Child Law: Guardianship and Custody (Rep No 
172, 1988) at [4.54] and following.  
63  Department of Health and Social Security Review of Child Care Law: Report to Ministers of an 
Interdepartmental Working Party (HMSO, 1985).  
64  At [17.25]. 
65  Children Act 1989 (UK), s 32(1) as amended by Children and Families Act 2014 (UK), s 14.  
66  Section 32(5).  
67  Section 32(7).  
68  Section 32(8).  
69  Family Procedure Rules 2010 and Practice Direction 12A.  
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ability to abstain will need to be tested over time.70 It must also be questioned how far the concept 
of proceedings being concluded "justly" involves justice, not only to the child but also to the 
parents.  
Legitimate concerns also exist in relation to the early stages of public law proceedings and the 
critical question of removal of children under interim care orders. The new procedures have 
effectively dispensed with what used to be the first hearing in care proceedings.71 In the light of the 
requirements now imposed in relation to pre-proceedings work, when the matter comes to court for 
the first time the norm will now be for a case management hearing (CMH). Such a hearing must be 
listed within 12 to 18 days of the issue of proceedings.72 Before this, the court will consider any 
request for the listing of an urgent hearing, which could be a hearing to consider an urgent contested 
interim care order. But any such hearing is not to result in delaying the CMH. The concern here is 
that the issue of the child's interim placement may be rushed and may not receive the careful 
consideration it has traditionally received. Where the child's removal under an interim care order 
was proposed, if contested, this would normally have required listing the case for at least one day 
and possibly longer. This would give the parents a proper opportunity to respond formally to the 
local authority's initial evidence and for that evidence to be tested in court. But now such a hearing 
is described as "urgent" and will take place only "if required".73  There is certainly anecdotal 
evidence that children are now being removed after limited hearings on the basis of the authority's 
written evidence and advocates' submissions, and that this is becoming more commonplace. Yet it is 
surely questionable whether (other than in clear emergencies) any child should be removed into care 
without the parents having an opportunity to test the evidence in cross-examination, and indeed 
whether this complies with the human rights of both parents and child. But in the new world in 
which time limits and case management take centre stage, the danger is that full interim hearings are 
seen as an unaffordable luxury.  
In care proceedings, which may result in one of the most draconian orders which can be made 
under the legal system, it can be of great importance to parents that matters are not rushed. The 
issuing of proceedings will come as a severe shock to most of them and the great majority will not 
accept at the start that they lack the ability to look after their children. It is only after measured 
  
70  A specialist Family Drugs and Alcohol Court (FDAC) has been pioneered in London in an attempt to deal 
more effectively and efficiently with this phenomenon. For an excellent discussion of the work of FDAC 
see Judith Harwin and others "Strengthening prospects for safe and lasting family reunification: can a 
Family Drug and Alcohol Court make a contribution?" (2014) 35 JSWFL 459.  
71  Under the revised Public Law Outline in Practice Direction 12A, the first stage is now normally for issue 
and allocation which includes listing the case management hearing.  
72  Stage 2 of the revised Public Law Outline.  
73  Under the Family Procedure Rules 2010, r 22.7, the general rule at hearings other than final hearings is that 
they are conducted on submissions, as opposed to oral evidence, unless the court directs otherwise or any 
practice direction or other enactment provides otherwise.  
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expert assessment, proper investigation of all the family options and sound legal advice that a parent 
may reach the sad conclusion that he or she is not up to the task and that an alternative must be 
found. The function of the proceedings is then in part to allow sufficient time for parents to come to 
terms with the situation. If this process is concertinaed, the result is likely to be more heavily 
contested hearings and less acceptance by parents of the ultimate determination of the court. The 
Family Justice Review acknowledged this problem but only in the context of the need to provide 
parents with support post-proceedings.74  
It is also questionable whether the imposition of rigid time limits reflects a sufficient 
understanding of the role of time and the time factor in family proceedings, or of the organic nature 
of such proceedings. Unlike many areas of the law in which there is essentially a forensic enquiry 
into what happened in the past, family proceedings take place in the shadow of ongoing family life. 
The parents' situation, that of the wider family and that of the children concerned, may and often do 
change dramatically during the course of the proceedings. It is therefore an impossible task to say at 
the start how long it is going to take to reach a proper determination of what is best for a child. 
Attempts to set clear limits fly in the face of this. A better focus would arguably have been on 
identifying and dealing with delays which are the result of incompetence and those which are not. 
The concept of "purposeful delay"75 insufficiently captures the essence of family proceedings. They 
are not so much about careful planning as about an appropriate reaction to events. The judicial 
function of "robust case management", currently in vogue, must surely take second place to the 
judge's duty to achieve the right result for the child. The better judges will readily admit this inside 
and outside court. The danger is that we may be promoting a culture of deciding in haste and 
repenting at leisure.  
Perhaps the most fundamental concern about time limits is that the no delay principle is now in 
danger of supplanting in importance the welfare principle. The reforms are capable of giving the 
impression that the paramount consideration or – to put it more neutrally – the key objective, is now 
completing the case on time rather than achieving the result which is right for the child. This was 
certainly not the intention of those who drafted the 1989 Act. There was no sense at all at that time 
that the issue of delay was to be given the level of prominence which this legislation gives to it.  
B Expert Evidence and Assessments  
Section 13 of the 2014 Act and the Family Procedure Rules provide that any party wishing to 
instruct an expert must obtain the permission of the court. Essentially the same test applies as that 
governing extension of time limits. The instruction of the expert must be necessary to assist the 
  
74  Family Justice Review: Final Report, above n 4, at [3.185].  
75  A concept which has its origins in a Law Commission Report, where the Commission gave the example 
where waiting for a thorough welfare report might outweigh the disadvantages to the child of delay: Law 
Commission of England and Wales, above n 62, at [4.57]. 
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court to resolve the proceedings justly.76 A similar requirement is imposed in relation to interim 
assessments of the child.77 A range of factors is prescribed which the court must take into account 
when deciding whether to grant permission.78  
These provisions do have laudable objectives in seeking to combat the problem of "expertitis" or 
the multiplication of experts in care proceedings. The point is well made that in some cases there 
was unnecessary duplication of expertise where, for example, there may have been both psychiatric 
and psychological reports, parenting assessments by local authority and independent social workers, 
as well as successive analyses and recommendations by the guardian. This may have been 
accompanied by successive and expensive scientific tests, not always sufficiently focused, for 
substance abuse by parents. The cost to the legal aid fund could in some cases be enormous, some of 
the ground was undoubtedly covered twice and delays were a regular occurrence while waiting for 
one or more expert reports to be made available.  
Notwithstanding these legitimate concerns, the anxiety now is that we have moved too far in the 
opposite direction. Two factors in the statutory list, apparently innocuous in their wording, have the 
potential for denying the admission of expert evidence where it is necessary. It is provided that the 
court is to have regard to "what other evidence is available" and "whether evidence could be given 
by another person on the matters on which the expert would give evidence".79 The implication of 
these factors is not simply that one expert may do where previously there may have been two, but 
that the evidence of two of the parties to the proceedings, the local authority and the guardian, may 
be good enough. This is an approach which appears to have received some endorsement by Pauffley 
J in Re MR (Welfare Hearing No 2).80  
The chief criticism is that it attaches far too little importance to independence in expert 
evidence. However capable and well-intentioned the allocated social worker is, there will be an 
acute perception (sometimes accurate) on the part of the parent that he or she is not neutral. The 
social worker will have produced the key evidence in support of the care application and is the local 
authority's key witness in the courtroom. Parenting assessments produced by the allocated social 
worker are therefore at best not likely to be seen as detached or independent. At worst they will be 
viewed as produced by the very person who is seeking to remove the children and has caused the 
  
76  Children and Families Act 2014 (UK), s 13(6).  
77  Section 13(11).  
78  Section 13(7).  
79  Section 13(7)(d) and (e).  
80  Re MR (Welfare Hearing No 2) [2013] EWHC 1156 (Fam), (2013) Fam Law 939 where she said that the 
local authority social worker and the guardian might not be "experts" in the technical sense but that they had 
provided the court with all the assistance it required to perform its tasks justly. That may be so in a strong 
case on its facts, as this case appears to have been, but there are dangers in taking this principle too far.  
642 (2015) 46 VUWLR 
  
proceedings to be instigated in the first place. In many cases, the allocated social worker will be 
seen by parents as having already taken a view (often adverse to them). It is worth remembering the 
comments of Wall LJ in Re EH in this respect.81 It is perfectly fair to say that this problem is 
ameliorated where a different team from within the local authority is responsible for producing the 
parenting assessment. But the underlying problem of being independent and seen to be independent 
remains. Further problems arise because the local authority's own resources are often just too 
stretched to devote sufficient time to an in-depth parenting assessment. This is a point which can be 
equally well made in relation to guardians whose primary function is in any event to focus on and 
represent the child in the proceedings. It is not the role of guardians to act as neutral experts on 
parenting abilities and many issues, for example psychiatric or psychological issues, will be outside 
their area of expertise.  
We need to get back to a clear understanding that at least some genuinely independent expert 
evidence should be put before the court, especially where long-term removal of the child into care 
outside the family is proposed.  
C Scrutiny of Care Plans 
When the last reform of adoption law took place in 2002, that legislation put care plans on a 
statutory footing for the first time. The local authority must now always prepare and keep under 
review a care plan for the child in every case in which it has made an application which could result 
in a care order being made.82  
Before the 2014 amendments, the court was under an obligation to consider the care plan before 
making a care order. The court had no power to direct the local authority about what should be in its 
care plan, but it had the ultimate sanction at its disposal of refusing to make a final care order until 
satisfied with the provisions in the plan. In that indirect way the court, often prompted by concerns 
raised by the children's guardian, could influence the care plan and the detailed provisions in it. One 
senior Judge, who heard a great many care cases, considered that courts did not abuse this power to 
scrutinise the care plan during care proceedings and that constructive changes to care plans were 
often made.83  
  
81  In EH v Greenwich LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 344, [2010] 2 FCR 106, he famously said at [109]: "What 
social workers do not appear to understand is that the public perception of their role in care proceedings is 
not a happy one. They are perceived by many as the arrogant and enthusiastic removers of children from 
their parents into an unsatisfactory care system, and as trampling on the rights of parents and children in the 
process." 
82  Children Act 1989 (UK), s 31(3)A, as inserted by the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (UK).  
83  District Judge Nicholas Crichton, "Comment: The Family Justice Review" [2012] Fam Law 3. 
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The 2014 Act curtails this judicial function, 84  again with the objective of streamlining 
proceedings and reducing delays, by confining the scrutiny of the court to the "permanence 
provisions" in the care plan.85 These are essentially the three options of: (a) placement with a parent 
or kinship care in the wider family or with friends; (b) adoption; or (c) other long-term care 
(effectively long-term foster care or, in a small minority of cases, institutional care).86  
The concern again here is that this is cutting corners at the expense of the best interests of the 
child. In essence the new provisions mean that the court is not to concern itself with the detailed 
content of care plans. But can local authorities be trusted to get the detail right? The devil is often in 
the detail of care plans and it is not uncommon for authorities to resist any changes to them which 
are liable to involve expenditure. Care plans and written agreements with parents, which can be an 
integral part of care plans, often spell out in some detail the obligations of parents and what is 
expected of them. But they are often light on the support package being offered to parents, and the 
extent of the authority's own obligations, where cases end with a supervision order and children at 
home. Care plans frequently provide for less contact than parents and members of the wider family 
would wish to have with children who, under the plan, are to remain in long-term foster care. It is 
important that these and many other matters of detail should be under the scrutiny of the court, with 
the benefit of the input of the guardian, but the reforms at best discourage this involvement and at 
worst prohibit it.  
D The Adoption Provisions  
The provisions which directly affect adoption are clustered together in pt I of the 2014 Act. Two 
provisions which deal with the issue of contact between children and parents in the public law 
context appear sequentially in ss 8 and 9, reflecting rather well the point that parents' contact with 
children in care and post-adoption contact are indeed closely related. In one sense they are the same 
issue at different points along the child protection spectrum.  
So far as these contact provisions are concerned, the policy of the 2014 Act, whether during care 
proceedings or post adoption, is to continue (as indeed the law must) to make provision for such 
contact. But equally the policy is to discourage it and allow for a judicial order prohibiting contact 
where necessary to safeguard or promote the welfare of the child. Where the child is in care there is 
  
84  But note the recent case of Re E (A Child) (Care Order: Change of Care Plan) [2014] EWFC 6, [2015] Fam 
145, in which Baker J sets out guidance, agreed by the President of the Family Division, on when a child 
may be removed from parents pending a change in the care plan which is contested. Such a change requires 
proper consideration by the court of the available evidence. In other words, the court must scrutinise the 
evidence supporting a change in the care plan where this would lead to removal of the child. In this case the 
child had, unusually, been living with the parents at home under a final care order for a period of 18 months.  
85  Children Act 1989 (UK), s 31(3A). 
86  Section 31(3B).  
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a statutory presumption of reasonable contact between the child, the parents and certain others.87 
But the local authority may refuse such contact for up to seven days in urgent cases,88 and the court 
may make an order authorising a denial of contact.89 These provisions sound innocuous and even-
handed, but the 2014 legislation has now amended the 1989 Act in a way which is designed to tilt 
the balance towards restrictions on contact. The cynic may say that the purpose is again to 
streamline care proceedings and push children through them quickly. This objective is not assisted 
by the inconvenience of having to allow contact between children and parents where the authority is 
clearly of the view that they do not support reunification. The legislation now makes it explicit that 
the normal statutory duty to endeavour to promote contact does not apply where contact has been 
refused under the above provisions.90  
A similar emphasis is given to the issue of post-adoption contact, though we should note that the 
2014 Act leaves largely untouched the arguably more important provisions in the adoption 
legislation governing contact at the time of making a placement order or under placement, but 
before adoption proceedings.91 The 2014 Act amends the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (UK) to 
create a new statutory regime governing post-adoption contact.92 The provisions have an initial 
appearance of neutrality on the issue. On a closer inspection however, the contact regime is not 
neutral. It leans towards discouragement of such contact. Thus, while the court may make an order 
for contact or an order prohibiting it, the child or the adopters/prospective adopters may apply as of 
right, while parents and others require the leave of the court.93 Moreover, while an order providing 
for contact may only be made on application, an order prohibiting it may be made of the court's own 
volition.94 The message is clear. There are significant hurdles to be surmounted where contact is 
sought, which do not have to be crossed in order to get it prohibited. It is evident that this will 
facilitate applications by prospective adopters who are opposed to contact, especially direct contact, 
  
87  Children Act 1989 (UK), s 34(1).  
88  Section 34(6). 
89  Section 34(4).  
90  Section 34(6A), as amended by Children and Families Act 2014 (UK), s 8.  
91  Adoption and Children Act 2002 (UK), s 26. This provision is arguably more important than provisions for 
post-adoption contact because, realistically, if direct contact is to be maintained between a parent and a 
child authorised to be placed for adoption, it really needs to the subject of an order at the time the placement 
order is made. Such orders are likely to be hotly resisted because their effect may be to reduce greatly the 
pool of prospective adopters or even drain it completely. But if ongoing contact between the child and the 
birth family is deemed to be in the child's best interests, it needs to be secured, either by declining to make a 
placement order at all or, if making one, making it with an accompanying contact order.  
92  Section 51A, as inserted by Children and Families Act 2014 (UK), s 9.  
93  Section 51A(4).  
94  Section 51A(6).  
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with the child's birth family. It is a further example of the deference already shown to their views on 
the issue of contact which is a feature of the jurisprudence in this field.95 
The other adoption provisions in the 2014 Act are unashamedly about promoting adoption as a 
preferred child protection mechanism for the long-term care of children.96 This follows the Narey 
Report and the Government's action plan,97 which largely gave its support to what Narey proposed. 
Thus, the local authority is now to be under a statutory obligation to consider placing the child in a 
"fostering for adoption placement", viz with foster parents who have been approved as prospective 
adopters.98 The intention is clearly that it may then be that much easier to move quickly on to 
adoption if that is the ultimate decision of the court. Likewise there is repeal of the so-called 
"ethnicity provision" which required the adoption agency, in placing a child for adoption, to give 
due consideration to the child's "religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic 
background".99 It was thought that this explicit reference to ethnicity was again slowing down the 
pace of adoptions involving ethnic minority children, and that the general provision in the 
legislation making reference to the child's "particular needs", "age, sex, background" and other 
relevant characteristics100 was adequate. Other provisions encourage the recruitment of prospective 
adopters and the further development of adoption support services.101  
E On a Collision Course with Human Rights? 
These legislative developments are taking place at the very moment that the higher courts have 
chosen to assert themselves over compliance with human rights requirements in the public law and 
adoption context. The landmark cases are Re B in the Supreme Court102 and Re B-S in the Court of 
Appeal.103  Extensive satellite jurisprudence has grown up around these decisions, focusing in 
  
95  See particularly Re R (A Child) (Adoption: Contact) [2005] EWCA Civ 1128, [2006] 1 FLR 373; and Re J 
(A Child) (Adopted Child: Consent) [2010] EWCA Civ 581, [2011] Fam 31. Contrast with MF v London 
Borough of Brent [2013] EWHC 1838 (Fam), [2014] 1 FLR 195.  
96  Though a provision facilitating contact between relatives of a person adopted before 2005 (when the 2002 
Act came into force) and that person's birth relatives was a late parliamentary addition which bizarrely 
became s 1 of the 2014 Act. It is noteworthy as the only provision in pt I which is clearly supportive of open 
adoption, albeit in the rather limited context of facilitating contact between adoptive and birth relatives 
where an adopted person has died.  
97  Department of Education An Action Plan for Adoption: Tackling Delay (2011).  
98  Children Act 1989 (UK), s 22 C as amended by Children and Families Act 2014 (UK), s 2.  
99  Adoption and Children Act 2002 (UK), s 1(5), as amended by Children and Families Act 2014 (UK), s 3. 
100  Adoption and Children Act 2002 (UK), s 1(4).  
101  Children and Families Act 2014 (UK), ss 4–7, making relevant amendments to the Adoption and Children 
Act 2002 (UK).  
102  Re B (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33, [2013] 1 WLR 1911. 
103  Re B-S (Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1146, [2014] 1 WLR 563. 
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particular on the procedural and evidential requirements imposed by Re B-S.104 In essence what the 
higher courts have said is that in order to comply with the requirements of the ECHR, adoption must 
be viewed as a "last resort" when all else has failed. Before making a final care order or placement 
order, the court must look at all realistic options holistically, as opposed to sequentially, and all 
decisions must be properly evidenced and properly reasoned. It is no longer permissible to "pick 
off" or "rule out" parents or other proposed carers during the interim phases of care proceedings, 
leaving adoption as the "last man standing". It is clearly doubtful whether a decision favouring 
adoption just because that appears to be the preferred solution, applying a welfare criterion, will be 
lawful any longer. There has been a deluge of appeals to the Court of Appeal where the Court, faced 
with many cases in which the reasoning of the court was not Re B-S compliant, has had to consider 
whether the judge in the lower court engaged with the essence of the balancing exercise requiring 
comparative consideration of all realistic options for the child.105 Whether or not the approach of 
the 2014 amendments is reconcilable with the human rights obligations insisted upon by the courts 
is now a fertile area of academic debate.  
What is surely clear beyond doubt is that the ethos or emphasis of these two developments is 
quite different. The 2014 reforms have a distinctly American flavour about them and are reminiscent 
of the philosophical shift which took place in the United States with the enactment of the federal 
Adoption and Safe Families Act in 1997.106 In contrast, the underlying ethos of the ECHR and the 
recent decisions of the courts is an attempt to achieve reunification of parent and child. Although 
understood to be a central aim of the 1989 Act, nowhere is this principle expressly stated in that 
legislation. It is perhaps this lacuna which in part has allowed the 1989 Act to be amended in a way 
which is certainly not supportive of the notion that reunification is centre stage in child protection 
proceedings. When adoption legislation was reformed a decade or so ago, there were those who 
pointed out that much of the world does not subscribe to the idea that compulsory adoption is even 
permissible, let alone a proper preference. 107  In many jurisdictions, there is a much greater 
willingness to work towards reunification with parents, or to promote kinship care, as indeed is the 
tradition in New Zealand. The pejorative, second-class image which we have of foster care in 
  
104  For an assessment by one of the authors of some of this case law, see Andrew Bainham and Hannah 
Markham "Living with Re B-S: Re S and its implications for parents, local authorities and the courts" [2014] 
Fam Law 991.  
105  The test to be applied to pre-Re B-S decisions of the lower courts as held in Re W (Adoption Order: Leave to 
Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 1177, [2014] 1 WLR 1993.  
106  See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse "The United States: The Adoption and Safe Families Act: A major shift in 
child welfare law and policy" in Andrew Bainham (ed) International Survey of Family Law (Jordan 
Publishing, Bristol, 2000) 376.  
107  See especially the comparative study, A Warman and C Roberts Adoption and Looked After Children: 
International Comparisons (Oxford Centre for Family Law and Policy, 2003).  
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England is not shared by others.108 It is clearly an area in which work is required in England 
alongside a more proactive promotion of the institution of special guardianship.  
This drama continues to be played out and, at the time of writing, it is by no means clear how far 
the courts will allow challenges to the provisions of the 2014 Act on the basis that they do not 
comply with human rights.  
IV CONCLUSION 
The 2014 Act is arguably the most ideological piece of family legislation since the Family Law 
Act 1996 (UK). While that ill-fated legislation sought to discourage divorce by slowing the process 
down, the 2014 Act seeks to encourage adoption by speeding the process up. It is indeed ironic that 
the now infamous pt II of the Family Law Act 1996 (UK) was finally repealed by the 2014 Act 
some 18 years after its enactment.109  
The essential thrust of pt I and the public law provisions of pt II is to get children through care 
proceedings as quickly as possible, out the other side and into adoptive families on the basis of a 
rather quick judgement that their parents cannot cope. There is no great enthusiasm, either, for 
kinship care in this legislation. Narey was notably scathing about what he saw as protracted and 
overdone investigations of family placements110 – an attitude which one suspects would go down 
extremely badly in New Zealand.  
This apparent policy has however come into collision with a burgeoning jurisprudence in the 
higher courts. This jurisprudence cannot be interpreted as anything other than insisting on the need 
for serious scrutiny and great caution before a placement order for adoption is made at the 
conclusion of care proceedings.111 Anyone looking at these developments in juxtaposition might be 
forgiven for wondering whether, in England, adoption is now the first or last resort.  
Within the private law we see again the influence of ideology and the importance attached to 
statutory language as a means of conveying an "official" message. Here the message is the 
importance of both separating parents remaining "involved" in the lives of their children. There is 
  
108  Warman and Roberts drew attention particularly to attitudes in the Netherlands and Sweden, where long-
term foster care has a much more positive image and is seen as (relatively unproblematically) inclusive of 
parental contact.  
109  Children and Families Act 2014 (UK), s 18.  
110  Narey, above n 3, at 11. Under the heading "Special Guardianship: An Unhappy Compromise" Narey quotes 
a senior official in the Department of Education as saying: "Special guardianship may simply mean that the 
child ends up in a different branch of an essentially dysfunctional family."  
111  The leading cases being the Supreme Court's decision in Re B (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria), 
above n 102; and Re B-S (Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose), above n 103. But see more recently Re R (A 
Child) (Adoption: Judicial Approach) [2014] EWCA Civ 1625, [2015] 1 WLR 3237, in which the Court of 
Appeal may be viewed as having tempered the effect of these decisions.  
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nothing new in this as an idea. One of the few worthwhile provisions in pt II of the Family Law Act 
1996 (UK) had encapsulated the idea all those years ago.112 What is new is that, contrary to the 
steadfast refusal of the English courts to countenance any legal presumption as to the best interests 
of children,113 we now have one in the 2014 Act. This is a very definite break with tradition. It is 
supposedly buttressed by a more neutral "child arrangements order"114 to replace what is thought to 
have been the polarising duality of "residence" and "contact" orders, but which is little more than a 
change of terminology with the disadvantage of greater complexity.  
A key question, cutting across both the private and public law provisions (including those 
relating to adoption), is whether the 2014 Act dilutes the long-standing commitment to the welfare 
or paramountcy principle. Critics may say that in the private law the new presumption of parental 
involvement does just that, and that in the public law the paramount consideration now seems to be 
not the welfare of children but the avoidance of delay at all costs.  
 
  
112  One of the factors which the court was directed to have regard to in considering whether it should exercise 
its powers to make an order in relation to children on divorce was "the general principle that, in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, the welfare of the child will be best served by- (i) his having regular contact 
with those who have parental responsibility for him and with other members of his family; and (ii) the 
maintenance of as good a continuing relationship with his parents as is possible": Family Law Act 1996 
(UK), s 11(4)(c). It was also a general principle under that Act that those exercising functions under it 
should endeavour, inter alia, "to promote as good a continuing relationship between the parties and any 
children affected as is possible in the circumstances": Family Law Act 1996 (UK), s 1(c)(ii).  
113  See particularly Brixey v Lynas [1996] 2 FLR 499 (HL); Re G (Children) (Residence: Same-sex Partner) 
[2006] UKHL 43, [2006] 1 WLR 2305; and Re B (A Child) (Residence: Biological Parent) [2009] UKSC 5, 
[2009] 1 WLR 2496.  
114  Children Act 1989 (UK), s 8 as amended by Children and Families Act 2014 (UK), s 12.  
